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THE RISE OF DONOR-ADVISED FUNDS: 
WHY CONGRESS SHOULD NOT RESPOND 
VICTORIA B. BJORKLUND* 
Abstract: Should Congress respond? No. It would be wrong for Congress to 
respond to the “rise”. Why should a “rise” arouse Congressional action when 
a “rise” is precisely the expected outcome following Congress’s “legitimiza-
tion” of donor-advised funds in 2006 by incorporating them into the Internal 
Revenue Code? We do not even have Treasury Regulations addressing per-
missible distributions yet. Depending on how those regulations turn out, we 
could see significant changes in distribution policies. Why would Congress 
act now when we have not yet seen donor-advised funds firing on all cylinders 
because we still await the much-anticipated operating guidance? 
The sponsoring organization of donor-advised funds is the entity that is 
recognized as a 501(c)(3) and that reports on Form 990, not the individual 
donor-advised funds. The totality of the sponsoring organization’s opera-
tions must comply with the tax code’s “exclusively organized-and-
operated” rules. By law, the sponsoring organization is the exclusive legal 
owner of assets in donor-advised funds, not the donors. The sponsoring or-
ganization manages interactions with its donor-advisors through its internal 
operating policies and procedures. 
Nowhere does the tax code prescribe penalties on 501(c)(3)s based on 
under-distribution of individual contributions. For example, the existing 
penalty on private foundation under-distributions is calculated on an entity-
wide, not a contribution-by-contribution, basis. Stated differently, the law 
does not force the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to track, distribute, 
and potentially penalize the Gates’ contributions separately from Warren 
Buffett’s contributions. Sponsoring organizations should be reviewed on the 
totality of their operations, not on the timing or amount of distributions of 
individual donor-advised fund accounts or contributions. 
Evidence shows that sponsoring organizations have been, are, and re-
main high distributors. All reputable sponsoring organizations administer 
policies addressing timing, distributions, and inactivity and retain variance 
or transfer powers. The IRS National Office reviewed and approved model 
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policies in 1998 as part of its review of the exemption application of Van-
guard Charitable. Other sponsoring organizations voluntarily adopted the 
model policies as “good practices” or rely on their exclusive legal control 
and variance and transfer policies as they interact with their donor-advisors. 
Sponsoring organizations report not having to rely on their policies often 
because donor-advisor recommendations already result in a high distribu-
tion rate. 
Representative Camp’s discussion draft proposed for all sponsoring 
organizations’ donor-advised funds a mandatory pay-or-penalize regime to 
be calculated contribution-by-contribution on a FIFO method. A 20 percent 
excise penalty tax would be payable annually by the sponsoring organiza-
tion on any portion of a contribution and its earned income that has not been 
distributed by the beginning of the sixth taxable year beginning after the 
taxable year in which the contribution was made. Given high distribution 
percentages by sponsoring organizations, what is the justification for sin-
gling out donor-advised funds from all other public charities for this treat-
ment? 
The justification may be based on two assumptions voiced by the critic 
cohort. 
The first assumption is that assets contributed to a sponsoring organi-
zation are assets that would otherwise be contributed currently to non-
sponsoring-organization charities. We’ll call this the “substitute-giving as-
sumption.” Professor Roger Colinvaux has written, “To the extent DAF 
contributions are not substitutes for other charitable giving, the policy con-
cerns with DAFs are diminished.” 
The second assumption is the critics’ assertion that the timing sequence 
of contributing first to a public charity that operates as a sponsoring organi-
zation and then advising distributions to other public charities is “not what 
Congress intended” when it enacted the charitable-giving deduction. We’ll 
call this the “what-Congress-intended assumption.” My review of the legis-
lative history of the charitable-giving deduction has not yet revealed any 
legislative history showing that Congress intended any particular timing 
sequence or any preference for one public charity over another. 
I believe the “substitute-giving” and “what-Congress-intended” as-
sumptions to be unproven. Further, they are contrary to my experience as a 
legal counsel, as a donor, and as a student of exempt-organization law and 
practice. 
Let’s unpack the critics’ assumptions. 
As to substitute giving, my personal and client experience is that a ma-
jority of assets donated to donor-advised funds are not assets that would 
otherwise have been currently contributed to a different charity. That is be-
cause people give to donor-advised funds for many reasons that do not di-
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rectly involve their past grantees: to build a charitable-giving reserve to 
spend in retirement (including to past grantees); to train their families in 
strategic philanthropy (including to past grantees); to accelerate bequests 
into charitable solution years before they might otherwise be paid thereby 
protecting for charity (including past grantees) assets that might otherwise 
be diverted to expenses or heirs; to monetize complex assets for distribution 
to charity (including past grantees); to avoid having to administer a private 
foundation; to accept memorial gifts in honor of a deceased person; and 
other legitimate reasons. One reason that donors might prefer to give even 
current donations (including to past grantees) through a sponsoring organi-
zation is to simplify and consolidate record-keeping (and sometimes to 
shield the donor’s identity for religious or other valid reasons). 
As for interpreting nunc pro tunc what Congress intended when it en-
acted the charitable deduction in 1917, the critic cohort urges Congress to 
enact a law to substitute Congress’s judgment for the donor’s judgment. 
This substituted-judgment outcome would be achieved by enacting a behav-
ior-modifying pay-or-penalize regime that would apply whenever a donor 
elects to contribute to a public charity that is a sponsoring organization. If 
this differentiation is what Congress now intends after 98 years of experi-
ence with the charitable deduction, what is the tax-policy reason for limiting 
the new penalty just to contributions to sponsoring organizations rather than 
extending the new penalty to contributions to endowments or to capital 
funds or to reserve funds at any public charity? 
There are good and valid reasons for donor-advisors to advise grants at 
different rates. Nonetheless, the critic cohort argues that Congress should 
substitute its and the cohort’s judgment for the judgment of each of Ameri-
ca’s more than 217,000 donor-advisors and of each of about 1200 sponsor-
ing organizations as to the timing of charitable distributions. In so doing, 
the critic cohort is urging Congress to overturn two bedrock principles of 
American philanthropy, i.e., that the donor won’t be penalized for choosing 
to contribute to one public charity over another public charity, and that the 
recipient charity knows better than government what policies to apply as to 
how and when to spend a donor’s contribution. 
We must also consider the law of unintended consequences: Tax policy 
should not drive donor-advised funds to become small private foundations. 
Doing so would needlessly waste on costs dollars that should otherwise be 
paid out as charitable distributions—not as fees to family, administrators, or 
service providers. Having to oversee 200,000 or more new small founda-
tions would increase administrative burdens and costs for the IRS. Instead, 
tax policy should do the opposite: drive donors to reputable sponsoring or-
ganizations that administer policies on timing, distributions, inactivity and 
variance and transfer powers. Reputable sponsoring organizations already 
72 The Rise of Donor-Advised Funds: Should Congress Respond? 
administer grant procedures that are as or more restrictive than a private 
foundation’s. From a regulatory perspective, it would be much more effi-
cient for the IRS to regulate a small number of sponsoring organizations 
(1250?) rather than a large number (200,000?) of small private foundations. 
An IRS audit of a few sponsoring organizations could result in administra-
tive changes being delivered to tens of thousands of donor-advised funds, 
whereas the cost of auditing tens of thousands of private foundations would 
be prohibitive. A result of a tax policy driving donors to DAFs over small 
foundations would be a reduction in IRS’s regulatory burden and costs. 
There is no tax-policy reason for Congress to interfere with the success 
that its 2006 actions helped to create. Substituting government judgment for 
charity boards’ and each donor’s judgments is not “the American way” of 
philanthropy. Instead, Americans “let 1,000 flowers bloom” rather than hav-
ing government direct which charities it prefers to see watered with contri-
butions. As Representative Utt said in the 1969 legislation history, “Private 
philanthropy has shown imagination and creativity in dealing with many of 
our pressing problems . . . [the Tax Reform Act of 1969] may result in many 
activities that are now reserved to our private sector becoming the responsi-
bility of Government . . . . These results would not be healthy for our free-
enterprise system.” 
A. Why should a “rise” arouse Congressional action when a “rise” is 
precisely the expected outcome following Congress’s “legitimization” of 
donor-advised funds in 2006 by incorporating them into the Internal 
Revenue Code? 
The term “rise” in the title of this conference is not defined. I assume 
that the term “rise” refers to any or all of the increase in the number of do-
nor-advised fund accounts (“DAFs”), the increase in the grants paid out by 
sponsoring organizations of DAFs, or the increase in contributions to spon-
soring organizations over some period of time. No matter which, isn’t a 
“rise” predictable when authorizing and legitimizing legislation is passed by 
Congress and signed into law by the President? 
DAFs existed for 65 years before being added to the Internal Revenue 
Code1 by the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (the “PPA”). Donors and their 
advisors who had concerns about DAFs before the PPA were now reassured 
post-PPA by seeing in the Code explicit authorization and detailed operating 
rules for sponsoring organizations, all of which “legitimized” DAFs. That 
legitimization by Congress spurred creation of new accounts. 
As Rick Cohen has written, 
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Back in 2004, Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) launched Senate Fi-
nance Committee hearings into charitable abuses and found an 
example of donors using DAFs to pay their personal expenses . . . 
. Such abuses regularly landed DAFs on the IRS’s annual “dirty 
dozen” list . . . . But with the passage of the [PPA] . . . , this kind 
of abuse has subsided and, to the extent that we can tell, is not 
tolerated among . . . DAF managers. As a result, the IRS dropped 
DAFs from the dirty dozen list a couple of years ago and they ha-
ven’t reappeared there.2 
Similarly, Howard Husock has observed, 
In previous years, legal uncertainty had limited DAF growth; but 
from 2007 to 2013—the first year of high-quality data for DAF 
sponsoring organizations reporting via Forms 990—the number 
of DAF accounts grew by 34 percent. 3 
There is no tax policy reason that the predicted and expected “rise” 
following enactment of the law calls for Congressional response. 
B. We do not even have Treasury Regulations addressing permissible 
distributions yet. Depending on how those regulations turn out, we could 
see significant changes in distribution policies. Why would Congress act 
now when we have not yet seen donor-advised funds firing on all 
cylinders because we still await the much-anticipated operating 
guidance? 
The PPA was signed into law on August 18, 2006. The Blue Book and 
the Joint Committee on Taxation Technical Explanation both discuss operat-
ing questions for DAFs and their sponsoring organizations. But we don’t 
even have Treasury Regulations yet interpreting the PPA. Depending on 
how those regulations come out, we could see some eye-popping changes in 
donor-advisor grant advising. Why would Congress respond now when we 
haven’t yet seen donor-advised funds firing on all cylinders because they 
are still waiting for the anticipated operating guidance? 
Among the most important questions on which guidance is expected 
are the following: 
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• “What is a more-than-incidental return benefit?”4 
• “Can a donor-advisor bifurcate a gala dinner or other ticket purchase 
with a DAF?” 
• “If not, what is the meaning of the reference in the legislative history 
to a contribution that ‘would not have reduced or eliminated the do-
nor’s deduction’?”5 
• “Can a DAF satisfy a donor-advisor’s legally binding pledge?” 
Lacking answers to all four of these questions, sponsoring organiza-
tions have generally refused such grant recommendations, pending guid-
ance. 
In an August 12, 2015, opinion piece, my co-panelist Alan Cantor 
wrote that the “legal restrictions on how grants from donor-advised funds 
can be distributed . . . are increasingly causing headaches and inefficiencies 
for nonprofits, while giving rise to misunderstanding and resentment be-
tween those organizations and their donors.” 6 The “strings” to which Mr. 
Cantor refers are the “good governance” restrictions that Congress placed 
on DAFs in the law, not nasty inventions of sponsoring organizations. His 
complaint reinforces the point just made: The field does not yet have Treas-
ury Regulations answering these key questions which Congress punted to 
the regulation-writers so don’t blame sponsoring organizations for asking 
public charities for certifications to help avoid potentially penalty-raising 
grant recommendations until the law is clarified. 
In that regard, I have long urged public charity fundraisers to be part of 
the solution. Those who have done so have increased the number and 
amount of donor-advised distributions they receive. How do fundraisers do 
this? For example, they include DAF-compliant “pledge” lines on their 
pledge cards, and they offer DAF-compliant membership categories in their 
membership marketing materials.7 That way, the soliciting charities cooper-
ate with the sponsoring organizations in educating donor-advisors about 
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DAF-compliant grant recommendations, and they help themselves by offer-
ing and then easily certifying their ability to accept complying DAF grants. 
C. The sponsoring organization of DAFs is the entity that is recognized as 
exempt under Code section 501(c)(3) and reports on Form 990, not the 
individual DAFs. The totality of the sponsoring organization’s 
operations must comply with the Code’s “exclusively organized-and- 
operated” rules. By law, the sponsoring organization is the exclusive 
legal owner of assets in donor-advised funds, not the donors. 
I remember speaking in 1998 with an official of the IRS National Of-
fice who was convinced that sponsoring organizations were massively non-
compliant because they had failed to file a Form 990 annual information 
return for each DAF. He was strangely relieved when I explained that, in a 
sponsoring organization formed as a corporation, each DAF is just an ac-
count owned by the sponsoring organization where the donor is granted the 
privilege of naming a person who may advise about grants and investment 
allocations within specific parameters established by the sponsoring organi-
zation. Similarly, it is the sponsoring organization not the DAFs that applies 
for and is granted recognition of exemption. It is the sponsoring organiza-
tion that will be held accountable on audit for the totality of its operations 
satisfying continuously the “organized and operated” requirement of Code 
section 501(c)(3). This legal structure was confirmed by the 2006 Congress 
in enactment of Code sections 4966, 4967, and amendments to Code sec-
tions 170, 4958, and 4943. Congress could have enacted even more changes 
but it elected not to. 
D. Nowhere does the Code prescribe penalties on section 501(c)(3) 
organizations based on “under-distribution” of individual contributions. 
For example, the existing penalty on private foundation under-
distributions is calculated on an entity-wide, not contribution-by-
contribution, basis. Stated differently, the law does not force the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation to track, distribute, and potentially penalize 
the Gates’ contributions separately from Warren Buffett’s contributions. 
The effort is afoot to prescribe penalties on an account-by-account ba-
sis or even a contribution-by-contribution basis. Even where the Code pre-
scribes under-distribution penalties for private foundations,8 they are calcu-
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lated on an entity-wide basis. As noted above, the Code does not force the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to track, distribute, report, and poten-
tially penalize the Gates’ contributions separately from Warren Buffett’s 
contributions. 
What about memorial-fund DAFs, which are typically set up between 
the death and the funeral of the person to be honored so that the memorial 
fund can be announced in the obituary and in the funeral program? These 
DAFs may receive contributions from over 100 unrelated donors, many or 
most of whom may not itemize deductions. What are the cost-benefit and 
policy arguments for tracking, distributing, and reporting each memorial-
fund contribution individually? 
A DAF-based pay-or-penalize tax regime would be a radical change if 
Congress were to impose it on donors and charities, especially in the ab-
sence of documented abuse. 
We know that Congress considered testimony on distributions in the 
run-up to the enactment of the 1969 Tax Reform Act, which enacted Code 
Section 509 and its definition of a private foundation and Code Section 
4942, which penalizes under-distribution by private foundations. 
The fact that Congress twice chose not to enact specific spending rates 
for colleges and universities, hospitals, churches, museums and cultural in-
stitutions, and other publicly supported charities—including sponsoring 
organizations of DAFs—suggests that Congress did not find a compelling 
reason to do so on either occasion (1969 or 2006). What is the compelling 
reason now? 
E. Evidence shows that sponsoring organizations have been, are, and 
remain high distributors. All reputable sponsoring organizations 
administer their policies addressing timing, distributions, and inactivity 
and may also employ exclusive legal control, variance and/or transfer 
policies. The IRS National Office reviewed and approved model policies 
in 1998 as part of its review of the exemption application of Vanguard 
Charitable. Other sponsoring organizations voluntarily adopted the 
model policies as “good practices”. But sponsoring organizations report 
not having to rely on their policies often because donor-advisor 
recommendations already result in a high rate of distributions. 
We know that annual sponsoring organization distributions have ex-
ceeded 20 per cent of assets for the past 7 years.9 Each sponsoring organiza-
tion’s distribution rate varies annually with its advisors’ recommendations 
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and the methods it uses to calculate its distribution rates.10 The data on dis-
tributions is annually reported by each sponsoring organization on Form 
990 Schedule D and republished by The Chronicle of Philanthropy and Na-
tional Philanthropic Trust, so I will not repeat them here. Suffice it to say 
that sponsoring organizations have high distribution percentages. 
F. Representative Camp’s discussion draft proposed for all sponsoring 
organizations’ DAFs a mandatory pay-or-penalize regime to be 
calculated contribution-by-contribution on a FIFO method. Given high 
distribution percentages by sponsoring organizations, what is the 
justification for singling out donor-advised funds from all other charities 
for this treatment? 
In February 2014, former Representative Dave Camp (R, MI) pro-
posed for all DAFs in his discussion draft a mandatory pay-or-penalize re-
gime to be calculated contribution-by-contribution on a FIFO method. A 
new excise tax would be imposed on the “Failure to Distribute Contribu-
tions Within 5 Years”. New Code section 4968 would require a 20 percent 
excise tax to be paid annually by the sponsoring organization on any portion 
of a contribution from each donor and income earned on that contribution 
that has not been distributed by the beginning of the sixth taxable year be-
ginning after the taxable year in which the contribution was made.11 
Since many DAFs accept multiple contributions12 from a single family 
or contributions from multiple donors to a single DAF (as with a memorial 
DAF), the practical question arises whether each contribution would need to 
be contributed to its own DAF in order to handle more efficiently the poten-
tially costly FIFO accounting and reporting on each contribution and its 
                                                                                                                           
 10 Recently my co-panelist, Alan Cantor, raised questions as to which is the correct denomina-
tor to use in calculating DAF-distribution percentages and criticized Fidelity Charitable for using 
in 2015 a rolling-average method used by colleges, universities, cultural institutions, and other 
public charities. In response to Mr. Cantor’s complaints, CPA Frank Monti published a comment 
to Mr. Cantor’s article in which Mr. Monti analyzed three possible methodologies for calculating 
sponsoring organization distribution percentages. He referred to those methodologies as the “tradi-
tional method”, the “NPT method”, and the “rolling average method”. Depending on which meth-
od is used, Mr. Monti calculated for the Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund in 2014 distribution rates of 
19.5%, 21.9%, or 28%. See Frank Monti July 22, 2015, response to Alan M. Cantor, “A Closer 
Look at a Donor-Advised Fund’s Payout Numbers,” Inside Philanthropy, Jul. 20, 2015, 
(www.insidephilanthropy.com). This interesting discussion shows that no particular method is 
“right’ or “wrong”. Instead, Mr. Monti points out that each method is useful for sake of compari-
son of sponsoring organization distributions to the sector that uses each particular method. 
 11 Tax Reform Act of 2014, Discussion Draft Subtitle C, “Excise Taxes”, section 5203 at 872, 
proposing new Code section 4968 (Feb. 21, 2014)(hereinafter the “Discussion Draft”). 
 12 Fidelity Charitable reports that a majority of their 72,170 Giving Accounts include multiple 
donors. “2015 Giving Report: A Deeper Look at Fidelity Charitable Donors and the Many Ways 
They Give” (hereinafter “Fidelity Charitable 2015 Giving Report”) at 4. 
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earned income? If so, proposed Code section 4968 could cause the number 
of new DAFs to multiply exponentially. 
An “eligible distribution” would be one to a charity described in Code 
section 170(b)(1)(A) other than one described in Code section 509(a)(3) 
(supporting organizations) or 4966(d)(2) (sponsoring organizations). DAFs 
in existence on January 1, 2015, would be subject to distribution penalties 
as if they had been created by a contribution received on January 1, 2015.13 
According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, Camp’s Discussion Draft of 
the Tax Reform Act of 2014, section 5203 would yield less than $50 million 
in additional tax revenue from 2014 through 2023.14 Since that is a small 
amount for a tax change, the proposed Code section 4968 is presumably 
conceived of as a governance provision.15 
The Discussion Draft thrilled Mr. Cantor because Rep. Camp’s pro-
posed 5-year distribution requirement was even stricter than the one he and 
Boston College Law School Professor Ray Madoff had promoted. Mr. Can-
tor wrote: 
I support the proposal by Professor Ray Madoff . . . that money 
contributed to [DAFs] needs to be distributed to charity within 
seven years . . . . When Madoff and I were two of the very few 
people in the country who were advocating for this required 
spend-down, we were gently ridiculed . . . . Then . . . a man 
named Dave Camp publically agreed with us. In fact, he said the 
required pay-down should be completed in five years, not seven.16 
The Discussion Draft’s pay-or-penalize provision has elicited strong 
criticism from many individuals and organizations represented at this con-
ference. 
For example, the Council on Foundations wrote: 
 DAFs are one of many invaluable philanthropic tools that com-
munity foundations use to engage donors and connect them with 
important local causes. . . . The Council respectfully requests that 
                                                                                                                           
 13 Id. 
 14 Alex Daniels, “House Tax Plan Would Penalize Nonprofits That Pay High Salaries,” The 
Chronicle of Philanthropy, Feb. 27, 2014. 
 15 The Technical Explanation is silent on the specific rationale. Technical Explanation of the 
Tax Reform Act of 2014, A Discussion Draft of the Chairman of the House Committee on Ways 
and Means to Reform the Internal Revenue Code: Title V—Tax Exempt Entities, prepared by the 
staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (February 26, 2014) JCX-16-14. 
 16 Alan Cantor, “Donor-Advised Funds Reform Faces Violent Opposition, For Now,” Nation-
al Committee for Responsive Philanthropy blog, posted October 1, 2014 (last visited August 6, 
2015). 
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the Working Group recommend that current law with respect to 
DAFs be preserved . . . .17 
The Independent Sector wrote of the proposed distribution regime, 
“[i]t appears that this concern is more theoretical than real,” citing many 
reasons that a delay in payout beyond 5 years can be warranted.18 
The Community Foundation Public Value Awareness Project wrote: 
The effect of the Committee’s proposal, however, would be to 
make a DAF very unattractive for donors and (1) potentially re-
duce overall giving substantially; (2) drive many wealthy donors 
to start private foundations, where they will likely give a maxi-
mum of 5 percent; and (3) add administrative burdens to commu-
nity foundations and other DAF sponsors . . . . What the five-year 
payout proposal for DAFs says to these families is this: ‘The very 
wealthy can set aside their money in a private foundation, main-
tain family control, grant 5 percent a year, and keep the founda-
tion active in perpetuity; but the upper-middle class family who 
wants to engage in philanthropy by opening a donor-advised fund 
must spend out all gifts made to the fund within five years, with 
no possibility to engage their children in a lifetime of giving. 19 
On April 24, 2014, Gene Steuerle posted an essay entitled “Dave 
Camp’s Tax Reform Could Kill Community Foundations”, in which he said: 
I doubt seriously that Chairman Camp’s staff saw fully how they 
would wipe out most community foundations and confine en-
dowment giving only to the rich. By making it more complicated 
and expensive to engage in [DAF] activity, they would move al-
most all endowment decision-making to the elite, often estab-
lished institutions where the average citizen has little or no voice 
and where the operational expenses are greater. 20 
                                                                                                                           
 17 Letter to John Thune and Benjamin L. Cardin, Co-Chairmen, Business Income Tax Work-
ing Group, April 15, 2015, available at www.cof.org (last visited August 25, 2015). 
 18 “The Value of Donor-Advised Funds,” August 26, 2014, available at www.independent
sector.org/uploads/The_Value_of_Donor_Advised_Funds_08262014_Annotated_Approved_by_IS_
Board_091814.pdf (last visited August 29, 2015). 
 19 “Written Submission to the House Committee on Ways and Means, Response to the Com-
mittee’s Five-Year Payout on All Donor-Advised Funds” from the Community Foundation Public 
Value Awareness Project, an initiative of the Philanthropy Practice at Van Scoyoc Associates, 
www.vsadc.com, Jeff Hamond, Director of the Philanthropy Practice, submitted July 14, 2014. 
 20 Gene Steurle, “David Camp’s Reform Could Kill Community Foundations,” TaxVox and 
The Government We Deserve, April 24, 2014, at page 2 (taxvox.taxpolicycenter.org/2014/04/24/
dave-camps-reform-could-kill-community-foundations/). 
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Similarly, Howard Husock has written about the Camp and Madoff 
proposals: 
The time-sensitive distribution requirement embraced by Madoff 
and other DAF-critics cannot obscure the fact that money that 
goes to donor-advised funds has been given irrevocably to chari-
ty. Therefore, it is difficult to understand why distribution within 
an arbitrary five-year period is preferable. At present, roughly 21 
percent of [national donor-advised funds] are distributed annual-
ly—a trend that, if extrapolated, means that virtually all DAF de-
posits are disbursed, voluntarily, within five years. 21 
Mr. Husock also wrote in “Does Dave Camp Hate Mark Zuckerberg? 
The Surprising Attack on Donor Advised Funds” that: 
Among the less-than-pleasant surprises to be found in House 
Ways and Means Committee chair Rep. Dave Camp’s generally 
thoughtful and constructive tax reform proposal is one targeting 
donor-advised funds (DAFs)—an important section of the tax 
code for those who think it’s better for the country if more funds 
go to philanthropy and charities than to the government.22 
The critic cohort is unmoved and wants more out of sponsoring organ-
izations. 
From Alan Cantor: “Yes, I write a lot about donor-advised funds. 
That’s because their surge is popularity is the biggest story in philanthro-
py—and to my mind, a growing threat to an already-battered nonprofit sec-
tor. 23 
And from Professor Madoff: 
I and many other critics of the laws governing the funds are con-
cerned that donors and the people who manage their money have 
been the primary recipients of benefits from the growth of donor-
advised funds, while charities and the people they serve are being 
starved of resources. 24 
                                                                                                                           
 21 Husock’s 2015 Civic Report at 11. 
 22 Forbes, 3/28/2014 (last reviewed August 11, 2015). 
 23 alancantorconsulting.com/tag/commercial-donor-advised-funds (last reviewed on August 6, 
2015). 
 24 Ray Madoff, “5 Myths About Payout Rule for Donor-Advised Funds”, The Chronicle of 
Philanthropy (Jan. 2014) (hereinafter “Madoff’s 5 Myths About Payout Rules”). For a challenge 
of the money-manager comment, see Husock’s 2015 Civic Report “Fee Structure” discussion at 5-
6. 
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G. The argument that charities are being “starved” by DAFs may be based 
on two assumptions by the critic cohort. 
The first assumption is that assets contributed to a sponsoring organi-
zation are assets that would otherwise be contributed currently to non-
sponsoring-organization charities. We’ll call this the “substitute-giving as-
sumption.” Professor Roger Colinvaux has written, “To the extent DAF 
contributions are not substitutes for other charitable giving, the policy con-
cerns with DAFs are diminished.” 
The second assumption is the critics’ assertion that the timing sequence 
of contributing first to a public charity that operates as a sponsoring organi-
zation and then advising distributions to other public charities is “not what 
Congress intended” when it enacted the charitable-giving deduction. We’ll 
call this the “what-Congress-intended assumption.” My review to date of 
the legislative history of the charitable-giving deduction has not revealed 
any timing sequence intended by Congress. 
I believe the “substitute-giving” and “what-Congress-intended” as-
sumptions to be unproven. Further, they are contrary to my personal and 
client experience as a legal counsel, as a donor, and as a student of exempt-
organization law and practice. 
The argument that charities are being “starved” by contributions to 
DAFs is premised on an assumption that DAFs are accepting contributions 
that would otherwise be paid currently to non-sponsoring organizations. As 
noted above, Professor Colinvaux has properly noted that “To the extent 
DAF contributions are not substitutes for other charitable giving, the policy 
concerns with DAFs are diminished.” 25 
Therefore, let’s unpack Professor Madoff’s and Mr. Cantor’s assump-
tions. 
                                                                                                                           
 25 Roger Colinvaux, “Donor-Advised Funds—A Hornet’s Nest for the Charitable Sector”, 
Nov. 2, 2014 at 1 (last visited July 27, 2015). 
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H. As to substitute giving, my experience is that a majority of assets 
donated to donor-advised funds are not assets that would otherwise have 
been currently contributed to a different charity, particularly a past 
grantee. That is because people give to donor-advised funds for many 
reasons that do not directly involve their past grantees: to build a 
charitable-giving reserve to spend in retirement(including to past 
grantees); to train their families in strategic philanthropy(including to 
past grantees); to accelerate bequests into charitable solution years 
before they might in the interim have been paid thereby protecting for 
charity (including past grantees) assets that might otherwise be diverted 
to expenses or heirs; to monetize complex assets for distribution to 
charity(including to past grantees); to avoid having to administer a 
private foundation, as a memorial fund following a death, and other 
legitimate reasons. One reason that donors might prefer to give current 
donations (including to past grantees) through a sponsoring organization 
is to simplify and consolidate record-keeping (and sometimes to shield 
the donor’s identity for religious or other reasons). 
First, sponsoring organizations are themselves public charities. Con-
gress amended the Code in 2006 expressly to require that a sponsoring or-
ganization be a public charity.26 Like every other charity, sponsoring organ-
izations have to satisfy the “organized and operated” test of Code section 
501(c)(3). Contributions to sponsoring organizations are irrevocably com-
mitted to charity, rather than to taxes or heirs. Therefore, charity clearly is 
not being “starved”. To the contrary, charity is being fed. 
But that’s not the critics’ real point is it? What Professor Madoff is ex-
pressing in that statement is her preference for contributions from donors to 
be given to charities that are not sponsoring organizations. She has written 
that the 5 percent payout for private foundations was “based on the idea that 
foundations should be allowed to operate in perpetuity. However, advised 
funds are essentially charitable checking accounts . . . and there is no reason 
for them to last forever.”27 
Stated differently, her view is that some charities are more worthy re-
cipients of deductible contributions than are other charities because of how 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Code section 4966(d)(1). 
 27 Madoff’s 5 Myths About Payout Rules. As numerous articles have pointed out, most donor 
advisors have no desire for their DAFs to last “forever”. There is a big difference between a short 
5 or 7-year duration and “forever”, hence the various distribution rates that lead to sponsoring 
organization-wide annual distribution rates of 13 to 28 percent. Fidelity Charitable reports that 
“most contributions . . . are granted out to charities within 10 years . . . .” Fidelity Charitable 2015 
Giving Report at 2. Further, would Professor Madoff argue that her rationale extends to all public 
charities that are, like DAFs, in the NTEE classification of “promoting philanthropy”, including 
other public charities that are grant-makers? 
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they use the contributions. She calls these “real charities.”28 This is a con-
troversial and dangerous view, in my opinion. Many of us old-timers have 
had those conversations with government officials in the past; this is the 
slippery slope of government telling donors which contribution merits the 
better treatment, the contribution to the food pantry or the contribution to 
the ballet or the contribution to the DAF?29 Government may favor contri-
butions to poverty-relieving charities as they could help to reduce the obli-
gations of the government. To date, however, Congress has wisely avoided 
ranking the relative worth of charitable missions. 
Second, there is strong anecdotal evidence that a majority of contribu-
tions to DAFs are “new money” or “accelerated bequests” or “set asides” 
for charity that would, for a variety of reasons, not otherwise have been 
paid at the same time the DAF contribution is made. (Many donor-advisors, 
however, will continue to give in the future to past grantees and want to pre-
fund their capacity to do so.) 
A very common reason that donors give for opening DAFs is to fund 
the arc of their grant making by contributing during earning years and rec-
ommending out during retirement until funds are depleted. Fidelity Charita-
ble reports that “[d]onors establish Giving Accounts as they approach re-
tirement age and 62 percent say they are using these donor-advised funds as 
a way to sustain giving through retirement.”30 Teaching children and grand-
children to give is another.31 Dedicating to charity proceeds from a current 
realization event is a third. Accelerating what might otherwise be a bequest 
is a fourth reason.32 
But how do sponsoring organizations get the critics to believe that 
DAFs aren’t “a vacuum for dollars that would otherwise be spent right 
away for charity”? 33  This is impossible to do except by asking donors 
whether they would otherwise have given their DAF contributions at the 
same time to other charities. 
                                                                                                                           
 28 Madoff’s 5 Myths About Payout Rules. 
 29  For more on this subject, see Howard Husock, “Philanthropy Under Fire,” Encounter 
Broadside No. 34 (2013). 
 30 Fidelity Charitable 2015 Giving Report at 2. See also Holly Hall, “Charities Seek to Attract 
More Boomers as They Mull Retirement Plans,” The Chronicle of Philanthropy (Oct. 19, 2014). 
 31 Alan Cantor criticizes a regular donor he approached for a client for turning down a capital 
gift request in favor of building up a family DAF. “Donor-Advised Funds Let Wall Street Steer 
Charitable Contributors,” www.philanthropy.com (Oct. 12, 2014). I understand his disappoint-
ment but note that the donor has every right to switch his priorities, especially since he has already 
given generously to Mr. Cantor’s client in the past and may do so again in the future from the 
family DAF. 
 32 For a sampling of the variety of ways new grants were conceived and advised, see the Ur-
ban Institute’s “Donor Advised Fund Stories State by State” at http://www.cof.org/sites/default/
files/documents/files/Urban-Survey-Stories.pdf. 
 33 Colinvaux, supra note 25, paraphrasing Alan Cantor, supra note 31. 
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In fact, many sponsoring organizations have asked this question of cur-
rent and prior donors. When asked, a large majority of donors say their 
DAFs contain “new” not “substitute” contributions. Mr. Husock reports that 
in “surveys of account holders conducted by Fidelity Charitable, about two-
thirds of respondents indicated that the use of a DAF account likely increas-
es their charitable giving.”34 
The assumption of “substitute giving” is not true in my personal expe-
rience. The 5 DAFs that I have personally opened have each received ex-
clusively “new” and not “substitute” funding. The first at the New York 
Community Trust was opened on behalf of my law firm, Simpson Thacher, 
to facilitate disaster relief grant recommendations. The second was at the 
Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund to smooth my husband’s and my charitable 
giving as we ease into retirement. And the third, fourth, and fifth were 
opened naming each of my three siblings as advisors, with my Mother as 
donor to the four DAFs advised by her four children. The last were funded 
in response to a transition gift-claw-back in New York State estate tax law 
that would otherwise have negatively impacted gifted proceeds from the 
sale of the family homestead. All four of these family DAFs received “new 
money” that would not otherwise currently have been given to charity. Had 
the NYS claw-back not excepted charitable gifts, this high six-figure 
amount would have been distributed to the four children as taxable gifts 
with the money split between the children and the federal and state govern-
ments; none would have gone to charity at that time. 
Instead, all four children are charitably inclined and were happy to ac-
cept DAF-advisory privileges in place of outright personal gifts. No one 
wanted to have to identify recipient charities during the stress of cleaning 
out and closing the sale of the family homestead. Rich people have had this 
timing capacity for years, but DAFs are the low-cost way that middle class 
people can support charity in a reasoned and thoughtful way, without rush-
ing decisions during a family stress event (sale of the homestead, a parent’s 
illness, receiving a bequest, a disaster). There is absolutely nothing nefari-
ous about different family members from 4 different parts of the country 
advising grants to new and different and past charitable grantees at different 
rates, and none of us seeks a perpetual fund. 
Third, inter vivos contributions to DAFs by definition come sooner in 
time than do bequests. From my perspective, the sooner the DAF is funded, 
the sooner the money is irrevocably designated for charity and starts grow-
ing tax-free for charity, and the sooner grant recommendations start rolling 
in to the sponsoring organization. Waiting for bequests to be paid to charity 
means delay for the money coming into charitable solution and risks that 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Husock’s 2015 Civic Report at 12. 
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changes in the will in favor of heirs will be encouraged in the interim, in 
which case money will go to heirs and taxes and not to charity at all.35 A 
current gift to a DAF in lieu of a bequest commits all the money to charity 
while allowing the donor-advisor to keep or change his or her choices of 
charitable beneficiaries over time. Being locked into specific charities while 
still identifying one’s favorites is one of the worries that inhibits donors 
from naming charities in wills in the first place. 
Fourth, all reputable sponsoring organizations have and administer 
policies on timing, distributions and inactivity. Some of those policies in-
clude the “variance power” wielded by community foundations and “trans-
fer powers” wielded by others in the rare event that they were to be con-
fronted with a truly inactive account. 
Because of high distribution activities, sponsoring organizations report 
rarely having to invoke their policies. For example, Silicon Valley Commu-
nity Foundation reports, 
Of the 158 [DAFs] at SVCF with balances over $1 million, 96 
percent—or all but seven of them—made grants during the two-
year period that ended December 2014. SVCF has an active poli-
cy of contacting donor advisors if they’ve made no grants in two 
years and encouraging them to recommend grants . . . .In SVCF’s 
history, only one [DAF] was ‘orphaned,’ meaning we were unable 
to contact the donor to advise grants. Per our policy, that fund was 
transferred to our community endowment.36 
I want to emphasize my belief that all reputable sponsoring organiza-
tions do have policies and do use them if needed. This is consistent with the 
“organized-and-operated” criteria under Code section 501(c)(3). 
                                                                                                                           
 35 “Most obviously, someone who decides to save and give later might not actually follow 
through with it . . . There’s a simple solution to this problem: putting the money into a donor-
advised fund . . . Because the money can be paid out only to registered charities, there is no temp-
tation to renege on the commitment.” William MacAskill, “Why Giving Now Multiplies the Value 
of a Donor’s Dollar,” The Chronicle of Philanthropy, August 2015, 32, 33. 
 36 “The Facts About Donor Advised Funds at Silicon Valley Community Foundation” (2015), 
accessible through Emmett Carson, “Whack-A-Mole and the Debate on Donor Advised Funds” at 
www.siliconvalleycf.org (last visited August 29, 2015). 
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I. There are good and valid reasons for donor-advisors to advise grants at 
different rates. Nonetheless, the critic cohort argues that Congress should 
substitute its and the cohort’s judgment for the judgment of each of 
America’s more than 200,000 DAF donor-advisors and of each of about 
1200 sponsoring organizations as to the timing and amount of charitable 
distributions. In so doing, the critic cohort is urging Congress to overturn 
two bedrock principles of American philanthropy, i.e., that the donor 
won’t be penalized for choosing to contribute to one public charity over 
another public charity, and that the recipient charity knows better than 
government what policies to apply as to how and when to spend a 
donor’s contribution. 
There are good and valid reasons for donors contributing at different 
rates and for donor-advisors advising grants at different rates. 
Nonetheless, the critic cohort argues that Congress should substitute its 
and the cohort’s judgment on charitable-distribution rates for the judgment 
of each of America’s more-than-200,000 DAF donors. 
J. If this is what Congress now intends after 98 years of experience with 
the charitable deduction, what is the tax-policy reason for limiting the 
new penalty just to contributions to sponsoring organizations rather than 
extending the new penalty to contributions to endowments or to capital 
funds or to reserve funds? 
The critics’ authority for this policy position is their interpretation of 
the speed or preferred target intended by Congress for Code section 170 
deductibility.37 For example, Professor Madoff has written that “It’s time to 
. . . ensure that charities and those who depend on them get the benefit Con-
gress intended when it created the charitable deduction.”38 
I have reviewed the legislative history to Code section 170 when it was 
“created”, its amendments, and articles about its history.39 I still have not 
found a distribution-timing or preferred-charity requirement in the legisla-
tive history. If it exists, I am sure that we would all like to review it. 
I did find that the deduction for charitable contributions is one of the 
oldest deduction provisions in the tax laws40 and that it was enacted in the 
War Revenue Act of 1917 as an incentive for donors to keep giving despite 
                                                                                                                           
 37 Mr. Cantor’s Violent Opposition (“The notion behind the charitable deduction is that these 
donations are for the public good . . . It’s hard to understand how a gift to Fidelity Charitable is for 
the public good.”). 
 38 See Madoff’s 5 Myths About Payout Rules (emphasis added). 
 39 See, e.g, Ellen P. Aprill, “Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction,” 
42 B.C.L. Rev. 843 (2001), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol42/iss4/4. 
 40 Id. at 848. 
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high wartime tax rates.41 The legislative history indicates that this provision 
was prompted by the concern that, without a deduction, wealthy taxpayers 
would no longer contribute to charitable organizations. 42 Professor Aprill 
writes that Senator Hollis feared that the war would affect colleges “more 
seriously than it does any other character of institution,” both by taking stu-
dents to be soldiers and by reducing financial support due to high taxes.43 
The legislative history quoting Senator Hollis continues: 
Usually people contribute to charities and educational objects out 
of their surplus. After they have done everything else they want to 
do, after they have educated their children and traveled and spent 
their money on everything they really want or think they want, 
then if they have something left over, they will contribute it to a 
college or to the Red Cross or for some scientific purposes. Now, 
when war comes, . . . that will be the first place where wealthy 
men will be tempted to economize, namely in donations to chari-
ty.44 
Thus, this legislative history envisions the deduction as an incentive 
for taxpayers to continue to donate their “left over” money to charity. As 
Mr. Alexander Reid has written, 
If Congress had intended to use the charitable deduction as a sub-
sidy, it seems likely Congress would have said what it intended to 
subsidize and why, and periodically reviewed whether the subsidy 
was effective. There is no legislative history to that effect.45 
K. One-size-fits-all solutions are not good tax policy for charitable 
distributions. 
The compelling truth is that data compiled from many sources shows 
that sponsoring organizations pay distributions at remarkably higher per-
centages of assets than do private foundations or almost all reserve funds or 
endowments at public charities.46 The critic cohort prefers donors to con-
                                                                                                                           
 41 Alexander Reid, “Renegotiating the Charitable Deduction,” 71 Tax Analysts No. 1 (Jan. 
2013)(which includes the legislative history as an appendix). 
 42 Aprill, supra note 39 at 849. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id., citing 55 Cong. Rec. 6728 (1917). 
 45 Reid, supra note 41 at 26. 
 46 CPA Frank Monti has noted that DAFs are distributing money to charity at a faster rate 
than any other past entity and because of that the DAF “has been a positive development in the 
charitable funding world.” www.insidephilanthropy.com (July 23, 2015 comment) (last visited 
July 23, 2015). 
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tribute only to what Mr. Cantor calls “operating charities”47 and Professor 
Madoff calls “real charities.”48 But not all “operating charities” spend con-
tributions immediately either, nor should we impose requirements that they 
do so. Our law generally leaves to the Boards and management of charities 
the decisions on what and when to spend. Dictating a pay-or-penalize re-
gime to the Boards of and donors to sponsoring organizations is an unhappy 
and unnecessary variant of a “one-size-fits all” mandate. 
Professor Madoff writes that, 
the reason current law allows endowments [sic] to let charities 
decide for themselves how to finance their missions. If an organi-
zation believes that creating a fund for hard times or spending 
frugally now better supports its charitable mission over the long 
haul, then we defer to its judgment.” But, she continues, “This 
same justification does not extend to people who contribute to 
advised funds, nor should it. Donor-advised funds don’t have a 
charitable purpose; they are simply a holding pen where people 
can put money before deciding where to give. If a donor wants to 
create a perpetual endowment for a particular cause, she can al-
ways do so within an existing charity or by creating a founda-
tion.49 
Professor Madoff’s argument ignores that fact that DAF assets are by 
law the property of and under the exclusive legal control of the sponsoring 
organization. Every sponsoring organization has its own mission involving 
promoting philanthropy and has qualified as a public charity under long-
standing rules. Many grant-making public charities have been recognized as 
exempt, not just sponsoring organizations. This short-term, account-by-
account proposal contradicts, rather than defers to, the judgment of the 
sponsoring organization Boards who have decided to permit donors to ad-
vise grants in a rhythm consistent with each sponsoring organizations’ dis-
tribution policies. If a donor wants to advise slower than Professor Madoff’s 
proposed timing, why should the donor have to go to “an existing charity or 
by creating a foundation?” The donor might not want the costs and man-
agement obligations of a private foundation or to create a perpetual en-
dowment but instead just to distribute grants annually during her retirement 
till the money runs out, as I and so many donors desire to do. Professor 
Madoff’s timing preference admits no justification for a slower-than-7-year 
payout rate. While most sponsoring organizations distribute faster than this, 
                                                                                                                           
 47 “It’s easy to understand how a gift to a food pantry is for the public good.” Alan Cantor, 
“Donor-Advised Fund Reform Faces Violent Opposition for Now”, at 1. 
 48 Madoff’s 5 Myths About Payout Rules. 
 49 Id. 
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I believe that good and valid reasons exist for some to have slower distribu-
tion rates and do not violate the letter or spirit of existing law.50 
L. We must also consider the law of unintended consequences: Tax policy 
should not drive DAFs to be replaced by an outbreak of small private 
foundations. Doing so would needlessly waste on administrative costs 
dollars that should otherwise be paid as charitable contributions—not as 
fees to family, administrators, or service providers. Having to oversee 
200,000 or more new small foundations would increase administrative 
burdens and costs for the IRS. Instead, tax policy should do the opposite: 
drive donors to reputable sponsoring organizations that administer 
policies on timing, distributions, and inactivity. Reputable sponsoring 
organizations already administer grant procedures that are as or more 
restrictive than a private foundation’s. From a regulatory perspective, it 
would be much more efficient for the IRS to regulate a small number of 
sponsoring organizations (1250?) rather than a large number (200,000?) 
of small private foundations. An IRS audit of a few sponsoring 
organizations could result in administrative changes being delivered to 
tens of thousands of DAFs, whereas the cost of auditing tens of 
thousands of private foundations would be prohibitive. As a result, IRS’s 
regulatory burden and costs should be reduced by driving donors to 
sponsoring organizations over small foundations. 
The law of unintended consequences should be evaluated in light of 
the ease with which a public charity can migrate into a private foundation 
classification, despite increased costs for entity administration and for gov-
ernment administration, thereby leaving less for grant distributions. 
Tax policy should promote tax administration by government and 
compliance with law by taxpayers. When laws add undue complexity or 
compliance expense, taxpayers should be expected to decamp to a lower-
cost and less-onerous alternative. Clearly, if burdens on sponsoring organi-
zations become too onerous, sponsoring organizations could potentially mi-
grate into private operating foundations, thereby maintaining public-charity 
deductibility and lower private-foundation-entity-wide distribution rules, or 
into private non-operating foundations.51 In the alternative, each future DAF 
could be formed as a small separate private foundation and managed by an 
overseer, the model now used by, among others, Foundation Source. 
                                                                                                                           
 50 For more discussion of the pace of distributing, see Husock’s 2015 Civic Report at Section 
IV, “Giving Patterns” at 6-8. 
 51 Code section 4942 allows private operating foundation rates to expend approximately 3.5 
percent, while private non-operating foundation rates are 5 percent of non-charitable use assets 
reduced by administrative expenses, carryforwards, and set asides. 
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Fidelity Charitable reports that in 2014, 60 percent of Giving Accounts 
had balances of less than $25,000. The median Giving Account balance was 
$16,097. Out of 72,170 Giving Accounts only 5,584 had balances of more 
than $250,000.52 Of, the 1,047 advised funds at Silicon Valley Community 
Foundation, 340 had balances below $25,000 and 575 had balances below 
$100,000.53  Foundation percentage and deductibility limitations are not 
likely to deter donors at these levels if they give cash or qualified appreciat-
ed stock to private foundations because they are not likely ever to exceed 
the lower foundation percentage limitations. If they do, they can carry the 
excess deduction forward for 5 years. 
Clearly tax administration is aided by having fewer rather than more 
Series 990 Forms for government to administer, review, and examine. 
Therefore, tax policy should strongly favor driving donors to DAFs at repu-
table sponsoring organizations because the sponsoring organizations are 
charged with monitoring the activities of their hundreds or thousands of 
DAFs, donor-advisors, and their disqualified persons or they or the donors 
will face already-existing penalties. 
Similarly, it would be much easier for the IRS to accept, review, and 
examine the 990 Forms of a small universe of 1,012 sponsoring organiza-
tions than it would be for the IRS to accept, review, and examine the Form 
990-PFs of a universe of more than 200,000 mostly small private founda-
tions.54 
Tax policy should not drive DAFs to become small private foundations 
because doing so will needlessly waste on administrative costs dollars that 
should be paid as charitable distributions—not as fees to family, administra-
tors, or service providers—and increase IRS workload and costs. 
Tax policy should also drive donors to DAFs at reputable sponsoring 
organizations over private foundations because, in addition to lower operat-
ing costs for sponsoring organizations and the IRS, DAFs have more re-
strictive grant requirements than do private foundations. This comparison is 
already being advertised. See, for example, the content of this recent ad 
published by a firm that administers small foundations: 
“Private foundations let you stay in control of your [sic] assets, pay 
expenses, and even compensate family members for their charitable work—
DAFs do not. 
                                                                                                                           
 52 2015 Fidelity Charitable Giving Report at 4, 5. 
 53 The Facts About Donor Advised Funds at SVCF, supra note 36. 
 54 NPT reports that it collected data from 1,012 sponsoring organizations of which 43 were 
national charities, 606 were community foundations, and 363 were single-issue charities. The NPT 
2014 Report identified 217,367 DAFs and 84,350 private foundations in 2013. 
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“Some of the kinds of grants that are routine for private foundations, 
such as grants to individuals, are impermissible with a DAF.” 55 
M. There is no tax-policy reason for Congress to interfere with the success 
that its 2006 actions helped to create. Substituting government judgment 
for charity boards’ and each donor’s judgments is not “the American 
way” of philanthropy. Instead, Americans “let 1,000 flowers bloom” 
rather than having government direct which flowers should be watered 
with contributions. As Representative Utt said in the 1969 legislation 
history, “Private philanthropy has shown imagination and creativity in 
dealing with many of our pressing problems . . . [the Tax Reform Act of 
1969] may result in many activities that are now reserved to our private 
sector becoming the responsibility of Government . . . . These results 
would not be healthy for our free-enterprise system.” 
Let’s be clear about what is happening here: Members of the critic co-
hort are urging Congress to override two bedrock principles of American 
philanthropy, i.e., that (1) the donor knows better than government to which 
public charity to give her contribution, and (2) the recipient charity—here 
the sponsoring organization—knows better than government what policies 
to apply as to how and when to spend that contribution once it is received. 
I have worked in France, Switzerland, England, and other countries 
trying to make their charitable-giving laws more like America’s. During 
those meetings I have heard over and over again that our charitable sector is 
deeply admired. In October 2014 in Geneva, I spoke on a multi-country 
panel to educate Swiss government and policy officials. We compared as-
pects of charitable giving law in the U.S., France, England, and Switzer-
land. All of the speakers mentioned the balance struck by U.S. law to en-
courage contributions of cash, securities, real estate, and tangible personal 
property by donors to charities while at the same time creating reasonable 
performance requirements for the charities that receive those contributions. 
The speakers pointed out that in other countries, government bears the costs 
of much of what nonprofits do in the United States. In contrast, the Ameri-
can third sector is seen as generous, innovative, and diversified, traits uni-
versally admired as the gold standard of global philanthropy. 
U.S. tax law governing charitable deductions and operations has exist-
ed for almost a century now and been flexible enough to let philanthropy 
develop and flourish, including the flourishing of DAFs over the past 65 
years. Clearly, today’s post-PPA donors are giving more through DAFs, 
making DAF-giving one of American philanthropy’s greatest successes. 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Foundation Source, “Donor-Advised Fund or Private Foundation?” offering a free compari-
son chart. Downloaded June 15, 2015. 
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And the magic is that DAF grants come in all sizes from donor-advisors all 
across our country and from all strata of our society. Public charities in my 
experience welcome DAF grants. 
I asked the Senior Vice President for Development of Robin Hood, a 
public charity that funds the most effective grassroots organizations fighting 
poverty in New York City, about Robin Hood’s experience with DAFs over 
time. She wrote back: 
Since 2009, Robin Hood has seen a 330% increase in the number 
of donors giving from DAFs, more than doubling total funds re-
ceived from these accounts. 
In the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy, the majority of relief mon-
ey Robin Hood received was from the 12/12/12 concert. Of the 
$21.1M in non-concert Sandy-relief gifts, $1.7M was from DAFs. 
In 2009, 82 donors gave 106 gifts from DAFs for a total of 
$6.7M. 
In 2014, 271 donors gave 328 gifts from DAFs for a total of 
$17.5M.56 
We all agree that the online ease and convenience of DAF grant mak-
ing is a more and more popular way for donors to respond to charitable so-
licitations (sometimes anonymously for religious reasons or to be shielded 
from solicitors) and sometimes to avoid having to collect, file, and produce 
a myriad of substantiation letters. 
DAF apps and widgets like “Donor Direct” are further simplifying and 
speeding up grants from DAFs. By clicking on a public charity’s website’s 
“Donor Direct” button, a donor-advisor can electronically advise a great to 
the pre-vetted charity if she is moved to donate at a charity event or in re-
sponse to an ad or to a solicitation email. These efficiencies appeal to to-
day’s donors who are used to shopping, paying bills, keeping tax records, 
and banking online. 
Numerous smaller donors can quickly and non-bureaucratically pro-
vide funding to charities when elite institutions can’t or won’t act. For ex-
ample, we are all aware of the increasingly urgent cries for help in 2014 
from Doctors Without Borders on the spread of Ebola in Africa. So what 
charity was the most-advised recipient at the Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund 
in 2014? It was Doctors Without Borders. Doctors Without Borders ap-
pealed worldwide for immediate cash to fight the epidemic. Fidelity Chari-
table reports that Doctors Without Borders received grants advised from 
more than 4,000 different DAF accounts.57 Would all of these donations 
                                                                                                                           
 56 Email from Krissy Sudano to the author dated Aug. 12, 2015. 
 57 2015 Fidelity Charitable Giving Report at 6 and note 8. 
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have been given currently from those 4,000+ donors’ individual checking 
accounts? I think that having the money already committed to charity in a 
DAF allowed the average donor to respond to news reports with a click or a 
tap, immediately launching an advised grant to meet this extraordinary 
need, to which agencies and governments were so late to respond.58 
By and large Congress, the federal government, and state charities of-
ficials have allowed charities to be governed by their Boards with interven-
tions by regulators only when a small percentage misbehave (such as Na-
tional Heritage, a sponsoring organization which lost its tax exemption) or 
under-perform (as Senator Grassley has asked about the American Red 
Cross’s expenditure of funds in Haiti). Similarly, government has long-
standing rules governing the timing of and limits on charitable contribution 
deductions that vary not on the mission of the recipient charity but on 
whether it is classified by law as a public charity or as a private foundation. 
Since 2006 and the clarification of the law applicable to DAFs, spon-
soring organizations and their donors do not appear to be an area the press 
or the field have identified as ripe with misbehavior.59 
So, let’s get DAF Treasury Regulations and watch DAFs operate under 
those regulations before we let anyone experiment with this wonderful 
means of charitable giving. Let’s let DAF giving continue its success, not 
penalize it for having been successful and legitimized by Congress. Let’s let 
regular people feel empowered to choose and use DAFs. Let’s not over-
regulate the middle-class way to give strategically, forcing everyone who 
wants the advantages of DAFs into private-foundation-like or actual pri-
vate-foundation solutions. Let’s not assert in the absence of proof that DAF 
donors want perpetuity. 
In closing, it is useful to consider how our predecessors viewed Con-
gressional intervention in charitable giving. Reflecting on enactment of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Representative James B. Utt (R, CA) offered the 
following “Separate View” attached to the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee Report: 
“The committee’s action in connection with charitable gifts may have 
an adverse impact on private philanthropy. Private philanthropy has shown 
imagination and creativity in dealing with many of our pressing problems. 
“The growing reliance on Government to solve all our problems is not 
healthy. The committee’s bill may result in many activities that are now re-
                                                                                                                           
 58 For more on DAFs in charitable rapid response, see Howard Husock, “Nepal Response 
Shows Why Donor-Advised Funds Are a Boon to Philanthropy,” The Chronicle of Philanthropy 
(May 1, 2015). 
 59 See text accompanying footnote 3 for Rick Cohen’s comments on this point. 
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served to our private sector becoming the responsibility of Government  . . . 
These results would not be healthy for our free-enterprise system.”60 
DAFs have resonated over the decades with hundreds of thousands of 
Americans and resonate now more than ever in our online age. DAFs make 
low-cost strategic philanthropy available to all Americans. Giving to and 
advising from DAFs has never been higher. Congress should not interfere 
with the success that its 2006 actions helped to create. 
                                                                                                                           
 60 “Separate Views of Hon. James B. Utt on H.R. 13270”, Tax Reform Act of 1969 Report of 
the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives to accompany H.R. 13270 (Aug. 2, 
1969) at 218. 
